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sive devices (RCIEDs) have been
a major weapon of choice by Iraqi
insurgents since 2003. One effective way to
prevent an RCIED attack is to use electronic
jamming devices to interfere with the com-
munication between the trigger and the
bomb itself. Due to power constraints and
other considerations, however, a jammer usu-
ally cannot jam all triggers simultaneously.
In this paper, we develop game-theoretic
models to study both active jamming and
reactive jamming. For active jamming, we
compute the optimal mixed strategy by
linear programming; for reactive jamming,
we use an iterative method. Finally, we
numerically demonstrate our models and
their applications.
INTRODUCTION
An improvised explosive device (IED)
is a bomb manufactured and deployed in
ways other than by conventional military
actions. The IED has become an increas-
ingly popular and effective weapon of de-
struction in modern warfare, and has been
used extensively by Iraqi insurgents. These
IED attacks result in casualties among both
the coalition forces and civilians, and sig-
nificantly undermine any reconstruction
effort.
RCIEDs refer to an IED that is detonated
by a radio signal. To detonate RCIEDs, the
insurgents use commercially available prod-
ucts as wireless triggers such as walkie-
talkies, cellular phones, and garage door
openers. One way to counter the RCIED at-
tacks is to use an electronic jamming device
that emits electro-magnetic waves to inter-
fere with the communication between the
wireless trigger and the bomb itself (Adamy
2000). However, in some cases, it is impossi-
ble to jam the entire frequency spectrum be-
cause the jammer has limited power and,
in some other cases, it is desirable to leave
open some frequency bands for wireless
communications. Consequently, the effec-
tiveness of jamming is highly dependent
on how the jamming power is allocated
among frequency bands. The traditional ap-
proach to this power-allocation problem is
to predict what RCIED triggers the insur-
gents will use, based on recent attack data.
The flaw of this approach is that, by the time
a new jamming strategy is deployed, the
insurgents may have already switched to
a different set of RCIED triggers.
In this paper, we develop game-theo-
retic models between the insurgents and
the coalition forces. The insurgents choose
a wireless trigger to detonate an RCIED,
while the coalition forces decide how to al-
locate jamming power among frequency
bands. The insurgents want to maximize
the expected damage caused by the RCIED,
while the coalition forces want to minimize
it. Because the game-theoretic models treat
insurgents as an active player, the derived
optimal jamming strategies do not rely on
past attack data and are robust against adap-
tive insurgents.
We consider two types of jamming tech-
nology: active jamming and reactive jam-
ming. With active jamming, the jammer emits
electro-magnetic waves in preselected fre-
quency bands, hoping that these selected
bands include those used by the RCIEDs
planted in the area. With reactive jamming,
the jammer first scans the entire frequency
spectrum to detect radio signals before allo-
cating its jamming power. Both jamming
models are formulated as two-person zero-
sum games. In the case of active jamming,
we solve the problem by a linear program;
in the case of reactive jamming, we use an
iterative method to compute the optimal
solution.
The remainder of this paper is orga-
nized as follows: the following section
introduces the game-theoretic model for
jamming RCIEDs; next, we discuss active
jamming and reactive jamming, respectively;
the subsequent section numerically demon-
strates the models and their applications;
and the last section concludes the paper.
MODEL
Consider a two-person zero-sum game
played by Red (the insurgents) and Blue
(the coalition forces). Red chooses awireless
triggering device (henceforth trigger) to
detonate an RCIED, while Blue uses an elec-
tronic jammer to interfere with the detona-
tion signal. Let T5 f1;.;mg denote the
set of all triggers available to Red, and
B5 f1;.; ng the set of all frequency bands
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ai;j5
1; if trigger i uses band j;
0; otherwise:

Most triggers use a single band, while some
others can automatically scan several bands to
find an open one, such as a quad-band cellular
phone. An examplewithm5 5 and n5 8 is given
in Table 1, where triggers 1 and 2 each use a sin-
gle band, while triggers 3–5 each use multiple
bands. Also shown in Table 1 are two parameters
associatedwith each trigger: damage and power.
The parameter di specifies the damage if an at-
tack via RCIED i is successful, i 2 T. In some
cases, it is possible to establish correlations be-
tween wireless triggers and the explosive mate-
rial, in which case it may be desirable to assign
different damage values to different triggers.
Otherwise, one can assign di5 1 for all i 2 T,
and the objective function becomes the probabil-
ity of a successful RCIED attack. The other pa-
rameter wi refers to the power necessary to jam
each frequency band of trigger i, i 2 T.
We consider a two-person zero-sum game
with simultaneousmoves. Red chooses one trig-
ger from T5 f1;.;mg to detonate the RCIED,
so Red has m pure strategies. Blue’s decision is
how to allocate the total jamming power among
the frequency bands, which depends on the
jamming technology, namely active jamming
and reactive jamming. We discuss these two
types of jamming technology separately in the
next two sections.
ACTIVE JAMMING
With active jamming, Blue has to decide at
the onset how to allocate his jamming power.
Denote the total jamming power byw, and a fea-
sible strategy is an allocation of jamming power
among n bands, as long as the total does not ex-
ceed w. Although this definition results in infi-
nitely many pure strategies, we can trim them
down by the following arguments.
First, each of Blue’s pure strategy can be de-
fined by the set of triggers it jams. If two pure
strategies jam the same set of triggers, they
should be regarded as the same pure strategy
even if they have a different power allocation.
For instance, in Table 1, allocating power 0.7 to
band 1 is equivalent to allocating power 0.8 to
band 1, as both of them jam trigger 1, but noth-
ing else. Because there arem triggers, this obser-
vation ensures that the total number of Blue’s
pure strategies is, at most, 2m. We refer to each
subset of Tas a loadset, and there are 2m loadsets.
Second, for each of these 2m loadsets, we can
eliminate those that are infeasible; that is, those
loadsets that require more than a total power w.
Third, we can remove dominated loadsets. For
instance, if it is feasible to jam triggers f1, 2, 4g
all at once, then any loadset that is a subset of
f1, 2, 4g is dominated. For a given total power,
let L denote the set of all loadsets after applying
these three steps.
Let l5
L denote the number of Blue’s pure
strategies after applying these three steps. The
value l depends on the total jamming power
available w. When w is small, there are few pure
strategies because most of loadsets are infeasi-
ble. When w is large, there are also few pure
strategies because most of the loadsets are dom-
inated. The largest possible value of l tends to
occur whenw is about half of the total power re-
quired to jam all m triggers.
To write the two-person zero-sum game in
the standard matrix form, note that the size of
the matrix is m 3 l. Red chooses one of the m
Table 1. An example with m¼ 5 and n ¼ 8. RCIEDs 1 and 2 each use a single band, whereas RCIEDs 3, 4, and 5
each use multiple bands.
Frequency Bands
Trigger Damage Power 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 1.0 0.7 1
2 1.1 0.5 1
3 1.2 1.0 1 1
4 1.3 1.2 1 1 1
5 1.4 1.1 1 1 1 1
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triggers to use, while Blue chooses a loadset in L.
When Red uses trigger i and Blue uses pure
strategy k, i 2 T and k 2 L, the payoff to Red is
vi;k5




Using the example in Table 1, and suppos-
ing w ¼ 5, we can write the game in the stan-
dard matrix form in a 5 3 4 matrix, as shown
in Table 2.
A two-person zero-sumgame in the standard
matrix form canbe solved by a linear program; for
example, see Section 3.10 in Washburn (2003). In
Table 2, Red’s optimal mixed strategy is to choose
each of the five triggers with probabilities
ð0:248; 0; 0:207; 0:191; 0:354Þ;
and Blue’s optimal mixed strategy is to use each
of the four loadsets with probabilities
ð0:104; 0:152; 0:468; 0:276Þ:
Thevalue of the game is 0.7442—the expected
damage caused by an attempted RCIED attack.
REACTIVE JAMMING
With reactive jamming, the jammer first
scans the entire frequency spectrum to detect ra-
dio signals, and then decides which loadset to
use. The radio signal can originate from a legiti-
mate use of wireless devices (normal use of cell
phones), or it can be a signal to detonate an
RCIED. The jammer, however, is not capable
of determining the nature of a radio signal.
Because a reactive jammer detects radio sig-
nals, its effectiveness depends highly on the ra-
dio environment of the operational theater. For
instance, in a desert there is usually little radio
traffic, so most likely the jammer can jam all
detected radio signals. In an urban area, how-
ever, the jammer is likely to detect a lot of radio
signals, which cannot be blocked all at once by
a feasible loadset. Consequently, the jammer
needs to decide which loadset to use. Let aj de-
note the probability that frequency band j is
used by a legitimate wireless device, j 2 B. If
aj  0, then a radio signal in band j is a good in-
dication that Red deploys an RCIED that uses
band j. If aj  1, then a radio signal in band j
does not render much information. Conse-
quently, we expect the effectiveness of a reactive
jammer to increase as aj decreases, j 2 B.
In the two-person zero-sum game with reac-
tive jamming, Red wants to maximize the ex-
pected damage, while Blue wants to minimize
it. Red’s mixed strategy can be delineated by
p5 ðp1;.; pmÞ, with pi denoting the probability
of using trigger i, i 2 T. Blue’s strategy, however,
is muchmore complicated, as Blue needs to spec-
ify the loadset to use after first detecting the radio
signals. In other words, a pure strategy for Blue
needs to specify a loadset for each possible subset
of B. Because there are 2n subsets of B, the total
number of Blue’s pure strategies is lð2
nÞ. For the
problem inTable 1, there are 4ð2
8Þ5 4256 pure strat-
egies for Blue. In other words, if we express this
two-person zero-sum game in the standard
matrix form, there will be 4256 columns, thus
4256 decision variables for Blue. Consequently, it
is not computationally feasible to solve the case
of reactive jamming with linear programming.
Let 2B denote the power set of B, which is
the set of all subsets of B. An equivalent way
to express Blue’s mixed strategy is to write
qkðDÞ, for k 2 L, and for each D 2 2B, with the
Table 2. The 53 4 matrix game derived from the example in Table 1, assuming w¼ 5. The payoff is equal to 0 if
the trigger is jammed, or equal to di otherwise.
Red’s Pure Strategy
(Trigger)
Blue’s Pure Strategy (Loadset)
f1,2,3g f1,2,4g f2,5g f3,4g
1 0 0 1.0 1.0
2 0 0 0 1.1
3 0 1.2 1.2 0
4 1.3 0 1.3 0
5 1.4 1.4 0 1.4
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interpretation that when Blue detects radio sig-
nals in D, he uses loadset k with probability
qkðDÞ. With this expression, Blue needs to spec-
ify the probability distribution over l feasible
loadsets for each D 2 2B, so the number of deci-
sion variables is l3 2n, which is dramatically
smaller than lð2
nÞ. It is still possible to formulate
a linear program to solve for Blue’s optimal
mixed strategy, because we can compute Blue’s
performance against each of Red’s pure strategy.
The same technique, however, is computationally
infeasible to solve for Red’s optimal mixed strat-
egy, because the number of pure strategies for
Blue is still lð2
nÞ.
In order to compute the optimal mixed
strategy for both players, we use an iterative
method adapted from that in Brown (1949),
which applies to a two-person zero-sum game
in the standard matrix form. In the first iteration,
each player arbitrarily chooses a pure strategy.
In the nth iteration, n $ 2, each player uses
the best pure strategy against his opponent’s
mixture of strategies used in the first n 2 1 iter-
ations. Robinson (1951) proved that the mixture
of strategies generated by this iterative method
converges to the optimal mixed strategy for
both players, as n tends to infinity.
To adopt this iterative method, we need to be
able to compute the best pure strategy for either
player against the opponent’s mixed strategy. In
the following subsection, we show how to de-
termine Blue’s best loadset against Red’s mixed
strategy. Next, we show how to determine Red’s
best trigger against Blue’smixed strategy.We then
present an algorithm for this iterative method.
Blue’s Best Loadset Against Red’s
Mixed Strategy
We first consider Blue’s best strategy against
Red’s mixed strategy. Let pi denote the probabil-
ity that Red uses trigger i, and let p5 ðp1;.; pmÞ
denote Red’s mixed strategy. With reactive jam-
ming, Blue first identifies the set of bands where
radio signals are present, and then decides
which loadset to use.
LetD 2 2B denote the set of bands where ra-
dio signals are detected. Recall that aj denotes
the probability that there is legitimate use of fre-
quency band j, j 2 B. Let
Si[ f j : ai;j5 1g (2)
denote the set of bands that trigger i uses, i 2 T.
Define 1A as the indicator function, which takes
value 1 ifA is true or 0 otherwise.UsingBayes’ for-
mula (see, for example, Ross (2006)),we canderive









If there exists a subset of D, denoted by
C4D, such that aj5 0 for j 2 C, then Blue knows
the signals in bands C are due to an RCIED at-
tack. Therefore, Redmust be using a trigger that
uses all bands inC. In this case, the probability it





On the other hand, if aj. 0 for all j 2 D,
then by dividing
Q
j2D aj in both the numerator
















where the equality follows because Si4D im-
plies that Si \D5 Si. In other words, we can
first rule out those triggers whose correspond-
ing bands are not a subset ofD; if Si4D for some





Equation (3) allowsBlue to compute the prob-
ability that trigger i is being used, based on
detected radio signals D 2 2B and Red’s mixed
strategy p5 ðp1;.; pmÞ. Blue can use these prob-
abilities to compute the expected damage for
each feasible loadset in L, and choose the one
that minimizes the expected damage. In the case
when two or more loadsets tie for optimum,
Blue can choose any of them arbitrarily.
Generally speaking, Blue’s optimal strategy
is complicated. One special case, when it can be
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determined explicitly, is given in the proposi-
tion below.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose all triggers use a distinc-
tive single band and require the same amount of
power to jam; that is, T5B5 f1;.;mg, and
Si5 fig and wi5 1 for i 2 T. Sort all triggers into
a priority list according to dipi=ai, with the first
trigger having the largest such ratio. Let D de-
note the set of bands where radio signals are
detected. Blue’s optimal strategy is to follow
the list to jam up to wcb triggers whose corre-
sponding band is in D.
Proof.According to Equation (4), the probability
that trigger i is used, i 2 D, is
PðRed uses trigger ijradio signals
detected in DÞ5 pi=aiP
k2Dðpk=akÞ
:
Because wi5 1 for all i, Blue can jam up to
wcb bands, or equivalently, wcb triggers, as each
trigger uses one distinctive band. Consequently,
the strategy prescribed in the proposition jams
the triggers that have the highest expected dam-
age, thereby minimizing the expected damage.
Red’s Best Trigger Against Blue’s
Mixed Strategy
Blue’s mixed strategy can be delineated by
qkðDÞ, such that loadset k is selected with prob-
ability qkðDÞ, when radio signals are detected in
D 2 2B. To compute the expected damage by us-
ing trigger i for a given Blue’s mixed strategy,
we can first compute the conditional expected
damage for a given set of background radio sig-
nals (radio signals due to legitimate uses of
wireless devices, as opposed to signals due to
an RCIED trigger). This technique can be found
in, for example, Chapter 3 of Ross (2007). Let
R 2 2B denote the set of bands with background








When R occurs, Blue will detect radio sig-
nals in R [ Si, if Red uses trigger i, i 2 T. Conse-
quently, the expected damage against Blue’s









where vi;k is the damage if Red uses trigger i and
Blue uses loadset k, as defined in Equation (1).
Red can compare this expected damage for all
triggers to determine which trigger yields the
largest expected damage.
Compute the Optimal Mixed Strategy
The iterative method suggested by Brown
(1949) applies to a two-person zero-sum game
in the standard matrix form. Because the way we
define Blue’s strategy—namely qkðDÞ, for k 2 L,
and for each D 2 2B—is not in the standard ma-
trix form, we need tomodify Brown’s algorithm.
In particular, in each iteration, Blue needs to de-
cide which loadset to use for each D 2 2B. Our
algorithm goes as follows:
1. Initialize the algorithm by arbitrarily pick-
ing a strategy for both players. For trigger i,
i 2 T, set ai5 1. For each D 2 2Band loadset
k, k 2 L, set bkðDÞ5 1.
2. Update Red’s mixed strategy: Set pi5
ai=
Pm
j5 1 aj, i 2 T. Update Blue’s mixed strat-
egy: For each D 2 2B, set qkðDÞ5 bkðDÞ=
P
j2L
bjðDÞ, k 2 L.
3. Compute Red’s best trigger against Blue’s
mixed strategy derived in step 2, as discussed
earlier, and denote it by i. Compute Blue’s
best loadset against Red’s mixed strategy de-
rived in step 2, as discussed earlier; denote by
kðDÞ the best loadset for D 2 2B.
4. Set ai 5 a

i 1 1. For each D 2 2B, set bkðDÞ
ðDÞ5 bkðDÞðDÞ1 1.
5. Repeat steps 2–4 for a predetermined num-
ber of times.
Robinson (1951) proved that the mixed
strategy produced by Brown’s algorithm con-
verges to the optimal mixed strategy for either
player. Furthermore, in each iteration we obtain
a lower bound and an upper bound for the
value of the game. The upper bound is pro-
duced by Red’s best trigger against a feasible
Blue’s mixed strategy in step 3, because Blue
can guarantee such expected damage with the
chosen mixed strategy. Similarly, the lower
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bound is produced by Blue’s best loadset
against Red’s mixed strategy.
NUMERICAL DEMONSTRATIONS
This section presents numerical examples to
demonstrate our game-theoretic models and
their applications. Themain example is summa-
rized in Table 3, where Red chooses from 10 trig-
gers, which together use 14 frequency bands.
These mockup data are derived from open
sources to replicate a plausible, real-world sce-
nario. In this example, we set the damage of
each trigger to 1, so that we can better interpret
the result as the probability of an RCIED attack.
Below we use this example to demonstrate our
models and their applications.
Effectiveness of Active Jamming
First, consider the case of active jamming.
As seen in Table 3, trigger 9 requires 33 45 12
watts to jam, which is the most among all trig-
gers. If the total jamming power is less than
12watts, then Red can use trigger 9 to guarantee
a successful attack. On the other hand, if the to-
tal jammer power is 30 watts or more, then the
jammer can jam all triggers at once. Conse-
quently, we are interested in the case when the
jamming power is between 12 and 30 watts.
Figure 1 shows the value of the game (prob-
ability of an RCIED attack) as the function of
jamming power, which is solved by linear pro-
gramming as discussed earlier. The probability
of attack decreases as a step function, as the jam-
ming power increases. The biggest gain occurs
when the jamming power reaches 12 watts, as
the probability of RCIED attack drops from 1
to 2/3. The rate of improvement stays flat in
some areas (such as around 18, 22, and 26
watts), and increases rapidly in others (such as
around 16, 20, 24, and 29 watts).
If Blue has several different types of jam-
mers—some with more jamming power than
the others—and operates in several areas with
different trigger availability, then Figure 1 can
help Blue decide how to allocate the different
jammers among these areas. From the standpoint
of research and design, Blue can use Figure 1 to
determine whether it is worthwhile to invest in
technology to increase the jamming power. For
instance, increasing the jamming power from
17 watts to 19 watts does not reduce the proba-
bility of attack at all.
Risk of Using Past to Predict Future
In a two-person zero-sum game, if Blue ob-
serves Red’s action over time and predicts what
Red will do based on these observations, then
Blue’s optimal strategy would be a pure strat-
egy. With this approach, however, not only will
Blue be overly optimistic in predicting the out-
come, but Blue’s performance can also be sub-
optimal and his action predicable. This section
demonstrates such a risk in IED warfare with
the active jamming model.
Table 3. An example with m ¼ 10 and n ¼ 14. The damage is set to 1, so Red wants to maximize the probability
of attack, and Blue wants to minimize it.
Frequency Bands





5 1.9 1 1
6 2.0 1 1
7 2.5 1 1 1
8 2.9 1 1
9 3.0 1 1 1 1
10 2.8 1 1
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Consider the example in Table 3, and sup-
pose our jammer has 18 watts. After removing
infeasible and dominated loadsets, there remain
32 loadsets. Consider a scenario in which Red
uses the optimal mixed strategy, while Blue ob-
serves 20 RCIED attacks and counts the number
of times each trigger is used. Blue then finds the
best loadset against the mixture of these 20 trig-
gers. What will happen if Blue uses the past at-
tack data to predict what Red will do in the
future?
Table 4 shows the perceived probability of
RCIED attack when Red uses the optimal mixed
strategy, while Blue determines the best loadset
based on recent attack data. For each jamming
power level, we vary the number of data points
from past attack from 20 to 80, and use Monte
Carlo simulation to estimate the probability of
a successful RCIED attack. For each case, we
conduct enough simulation runs so that the
standard error is less than 1 percent of the esti-
mate. In the last row, we also report the value
of the game, which is also the case when the
number of data points tends to infinity, because
Blue can observe precisely what Red’s optimal
mixed strategy is in that case.
As shown in Table 4, Blue tends to be overly
optimistic. Even when there are 80 data points,
the perceived attack probability still ranges be-
tween 77 and 85 percent of the value of the
game. Blue is falsely informed, as the actual dan-
ger of RCIED attack is higher than Blue expects.
When choosing the best loadset based on
past attack data, it is possible to achieve the
value of the game, if the chosen loadset happens
to be active in Blue’s optimal mixed strategy,
and if Red continues to use the same mixed
strategy. The real risk of using past to predict
Table 4. The probability of a successful RCIED attack perceived by Blue, when Red uses the optimalmixed strat-
egy, while Blue determines the best loadset based on past attack data. The numbers in the parentheses are the




18 watts 22 watts 26 watts
20 0.330 (66.0%) 0.222 (66.7%) 0.139 (55.6%)
40 0.377 (75.4%) 0.252 (75.7%) 0.172 (68.9%)
60 0.399 (79.7%) 0.265 (79.4%) 0.184 (73.7%)
80 0.412 (82.4%) 0.281 (84.2%) 0.193 (77.2%)
N 0.500 (100%) 0.333 (100%) 0.250 (100%)
Figure 1. The value of the game (probability of a successful attack) with active jamming as a function of the
jamming power for the example in Table 3.
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future, however, is to falsely assume Red is an
inactive player, who continues to do what
he has been doing. If Blue uses the procedure
discussed in this section to deploy his jammer
loadset, then Red can also collect the past
attack data, compute the ‘‘best’’ loadset Blue
will use, and then use a trigger that is not cov-
ered by that loadset. The consequence is the at-
tack probability of 1.
Effect of Background Radio Traffic
on Reactive Jamming
With reactive jamming, the jammer first
scans the entire frequency spectrum before de-
ciding which loadset to use. One can expect
the performance of reactive jamming to depend
a lot on the radio environment in the operational
theater. For instance, in a desert where there is
little background radio traffic (radio signals
due to legitimate use of wireless devices), the
jammer can almost always find a loadset to
block all possible triggers after first detecting ra-
dio signals. On the other hand, in an urban area
where people use a variety of wireless devices
all the time, there may not be much difference
between active jamming and reactive jamming.
In our experiments, we assume the proba-
bility that each band has background radio traf-
fic is the same, so that we can better interpret the
results; that is, aj5a, for all j 2 B. When a5 1,
the reactive jammer detects radio signals in all
the frequency bands, so listening does not pro-
vide any additional information. Consequently,
the case a5 1 with reactive jamming coincides
with the case of active jamming. The smaller
the value of a, the less the background traffic,
and the more likely the reactive jammer can
block all possible triggers after first scanning
the frequency spectrum. Consequently, the prob-
ability of a successful RCIED attack increases as
a increases.
We use the same example in Table 3, and
consider three power levels: 18, 22, and 26watts.
Figure 2 shows the performance of reactive jam-
ming as a function of a, which ranges from 0.4 to
1. For each scenario, we use the algorithm for
computing the optimal mixed strategy with
100,000 iterations to estimate the value of the
game (probability of attack). The difference be-
tween the upper bound and the lower bound,
in each scenario, is less than 1 percent of the
value of the game. The probability of attack is
plotted as a percentage to that of active jamming.
In other words, the plot shows the improvement
of reactive jamming over active jamming.
As seen in Figure 2, the performance of reac-
tive jamming is very sensitive to a, as the prob-
ability of attack drops significantly when a
decreases from 1. Also seen in Figure 2, themore
the jamming power, the more the improvement
of reactive jamming over active jamming. If Blue
has several types of jammers—with both active
Figure 2. Performance of reactive jamming as a function of the probability of background radio traffic in each
band for the problem in Table 3.
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jamming and reactive jamming—then Blue can
use this analysis to determine how to allocate
these different jammers among operational the-
aters with different environmental parameters.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper develops a combat model be-
tween Red, who chooses a wireless trigger to
detonate an RCIED, and Blue, who uses an elec-
tronic jammer to prevent an RCIED attack. We
developmodels for active jamming and reactive
jamming, as well as algorithms to solve both
these models. We demonstrate our findings
with numerical examples.
Using game theory, our proposed jamming
strategy is significant in two ways. First, Blue
does not need to estimate Red’s propensity for
using each trigger. Blue’s optimal jamming
strategy depends only on the triggers available
to Red, and takes into account the best Red
can do. Second, Blue’s optimal jamming strat-
egy is randomized. A deterministic jamming
loadset can become predictable. If the open
bands remain the same, then Red, after a period
of time, will learn about them and start to de-
ploy wireless triggers to exploit those open
bands. In the worst case, it is possible for Red
to deploy a certain set of triggers to manipulate
Blue into choosing a certain loadset, and then
switch to another wireless trigger to guarantee
a successful RCIED attack. The proposed jam-
ming strategy, based on game theory, is robust
against an intelligent and quick-learning enemy.
In our model, we assume that it costs the
same for Red to use any trigger. This assump-
tion can be relaxed by letting ci denote the cost
of trigger i, i 2 T. By substituting di with di=ci,
each of Red’s active pure strategies (trigger se-
lected with nonzero probability) will yield the
same expected-damage-to-cost ratio. Consider
a scenario in which Red has a big budget, which
ismuch larger thanmaxi2T ci. Bymaximizing the
expected-damage-to-cost ratio of each RCIED
attack, Red maximizes the total expected dam-
age he can cause with the given budget.
There are a few possible future research di-
rections. On the practical side, effort is needed
to compile and feed the real-world data into
the model, including the wireless triggers avail-
able and their specifications. It is also worth-
while to study the effect of how frequently
Blue updates his loadset. On the theoretical
side, we assume that the radio environment is
common knowledge in the case of reactive jam-
ming, but what happens if that is not the case? It
is also interesting to see how Red can exploit re-
active jamming by using the other wireless de-
vices at the same time of a planned RCIED
attack. Inundating the frequency bands with ra-
dio signals can confuse the reactive jammer and
reduce its effectiveness.
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